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Les enseignements du mandat californien sur les véhicules à 
émissions nulles : d’une réglementation « technology-forcing » a une 
réglementation « market-oriented »  
Résumé 
Afin d’analyser précisément les relations qu’entretiennent les processus d’innovation et 
réglementaires le cas de la réglementation californienne sur les véhicules à émission nulle 
est examine en détail depuis la période de débat pré-réglementaire a la fin des années 
1980 jusqu’aux dernières tentatives de révisions en 2003. L’approche privilégiée pour 
traiter ce cas consiste non pas a rechercher des effets mécaniques réciproques entre les 
aspects réglementaires et les développements technologiques, mais a tenter de replacer 
leurs influences réciproques selon les comportements stratégiques des divers acteurs qui 
interviennent dans ces processus. Les réglementations véhiculent des hypothèses quant 
aux comportements et réactions des utilisateurs, des producteurs et également quant aux 
performances potentielles des diverses technologies alternatives. Ces hypothèses sont 
étroitement dépendantes des stratégies propres aux détenteurs du pouvoir réglementaire et 
des informations qui leur sont accessibles, via les divers groupes d’utilisateurs potentiels, 
de citoyens concernes, d’industriels... C’est dans ce contexte de jeux stratégiques 
complexes que doivent être appréhendées les relations entre les processus d’innovation et 
réglementaires. Apres avoir retrace ces jeux stratégiques selon les différentes phases qu’a 
traverse le ZEV Mandate et mis en évidence dans ce cadre les relations entre les 
processus d’innovation et réglementaires, nous concluons en nous intéressant aux grands 
dilemmes auxquels doit faire face les régulateurs dans un contexte d’incertitude 
technologique. 
 
Mots-clé : Réglementation Environnement Innovation Jeux stratégiques Véhicule 
électrique 
 
Lessons learned from the case of the Californian ZEV Mandate: From a 
“technology-forcing” to a “market-driven” regulation 
Abstract 
In this paper, we investigate how Californian regulatory authorities and the principal 
stakeholders that have contributed to the design of the ZEV Mandate have dealt with this 
complex task. In the first three sections we present, in three stages, the evolution of the 
ZEV Mandate from its inception to the most recent developments, trying to reconstruct the 
debate that surrounded this evolution. We present some conclusions in the final section. 
Given the constructivist approach we adopt in this paper, our contribution can only be 
modest. No definitive, consensual and ready-to-apply lessons can be drawn from such a 
controversial case. However, the Californian example, particularly because of its excesses 
in various regards, offers valuable inputs to draw a line around technology-forcing 
regulations, stressing the major pitfalls of the regulatory design process. Moreover, this 
case has proved especially powerful in raising lively debates among the various 
communities of stakeholders involved to a greater or lesser extent in alternative vehicles 
and more generally in environmental regulations. We claim that these types of debate are 
nothing less than the very first stage of the design and evaluation of an “effective” 
regulation. 
Keywords: Regulation Environment Innovation Strategic behaviors Electric vehicle 
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Introduction
1 
Since the 1970s, Californian environmental regulations have been observed with 
scrutiny by all concerned policy makers and scholars in the rest of the US but also in Europe 
and Japan. Especially in the domain of vehicle pollution, their stringent regulations have acted 
as a “model of practise” far beyond the frontiers of the state (Braun, Wield, 1994, p. 266). 
A particular landmark in the history of Californian air pollution regulations was the vote 
of the Zero Emission Vehicle Mandate (hereafter “ZEV Mandate”) in September 1990. This 
regulation was implemented by the Californian Air Resource Board (CARB), an institution 
with a long history of developing and implementing programs to improve air quality in 
California. The ZEV Mandate aimed at drastically reducing mobile source of pollution by 
forcing the seven largest carmakers to produce and commercialise an important and 
increasing number of vehicles with no onboard polluting emissions in 1998, 2001 and 2003. 
Because of the magnitude of the requirements that carmakers had to meet, in terms of both 
number and type of vehicles, the ZEV Mandate triggered extreme, positive and negative, 
reactions among various communities of stakeholders. As a result, it ambiguously affected the 
pace and direction of technical changes in the area of alternative vehicles. Therefore, more 
than a decade later, although the results on technical progress and air quality might not be as 
straightforward as was originally planned, the ZEV Mandate still acts as a “perfect 
laboratory” to investigate the interaction between environmental innovation and regulation. 
Given the doubts raised by the effectiveness of the consensus-based regulatory approach 
implemented by the European Commission, the case of the stringent “technology-forcing” 
Californian regulation might be especially useful to European policy makers. 
The reference to an optimal regulation as a concept tool in order to drive and advise the 
regulatory process is now increasingly subject to criticism. Regulations are not optimal nor 
designed to be so; they are the result of a negotiation process, more or less open and equitable, 
involving public and private groups of stakeholders. They are a crucial component of the 
institutional infrastructure that -paraphrasing the famous definition of institutions provided by 
J.R Commons- not only collectively control, but also liberate and expand, individual action 
(Commons, 1931). According to that perspective, regulations are not “opposed to market 
mechanisms”, nor even merely supposed to correct their failures, they contribute to the social 
construction of technologies and markets (Brown, 2001; Braun, Wield, 1994). Particularly 
when environmental issues and/or long-term objectives are at stake, as is the case for 
alternative vehicles, regulations can provide an agenda and direction for related technological 
change and product attributes in socially desirable ways. Although regulations are only one 
component of technology policy and must be coordinated with technology promotion 
initiatives (research and demonstration programs for instance), the well-documented history 
of science and technology has proven that they are essential for the success of controversial 
technologies.  
However, it is not our objective to replace pessimistic and individualistic neo-liberal 
theories with a naïve view of the regulatory process based on the “miracle” of multi-
stakeholders negotiations. On the contrary, in the absence of any reference to an optimal 
                                                 
1 Ce working paper a été présenté à la Conférence Propulsioni alternative e settore auto: opzioni possibli, vincoli 
economici e potenzialita di sviluppo, Turin, le 25 Octobre 2002. Nous tenons a remercier Giuseppe Calabrese 
(Ceris-CNR) et Andrea Bardi (Istituto Per il Lavoro) pour leurs commentaires. Lessons learned from the Californian ZEV Mandate 
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regulation or self-regulatory approach, the question of the design of the regulation is an even 
greater task. The latter is all the more complex since there is no consensus on what 
technologies or prescriptions are “socially desirable”. There is no consensus either on what is 
“possible” given the great market and technology uncertainties. Finally, most categories of 
actors, including public authorities to some extent, carry particular interests and therefore try 
to influence the regulations towards specific directions, which may not be compatible with the 
collectively determined socially desirable ends. 
In this paper, we investigate how Californian regulatory authorities and the principal 
stakeholders that have contributed to the design of the ZEV Mandate have dealt with this 
complex task. In the first three sections we present, in three stages, the evolution of the ZEV 
Mandate from its inception to the most recent developments, trying to reconstruct the debate 
that surrounded this evolution. We present some conclusions in the final section. Given the 
constructivist approach we adopt in this paper, our contribution can only be modest. No 
definitive, consensual and ready-to-apply lessons can be drawn from such a controversial 
case. However, the Californian example, particularly because of its excesses in various 
regards, offers valuable inputs to draw a line around technology-forcing regulations, stressing 
the major pitfalls of the regulatory design process. Moreover, this case has proved especially 
powerful in raising lively debates among the various communities of stakeholders involved to 
a greater or lesser extent in alternative vehicles and more generally in environmental 
regulations. We claim that these types of debate are nothing less than the very first stage of 
the design and evaluation of an “effective” regulation.  
 
Once Upon A Time In The West: The First Phase Of The 
ZEV Mandate (1990-1995) 
Although the ZEV Mandate surprisingly did not raise a considerable debate before it 
was voted, the magnitude of the requirements triggered major conflicts between the pro and 
the anti mandate when both camps realized what was at stake with this regulation. 
The pre-mandate period 
It is very hard to find information regarding what happened before the vote of the ZEV 
Mandate in California. This might be evidence, backed by conversations we have had with 
protagonists, that very little public and technical debate took place at that time, despite the 
high stakes associated with this stringent regulation.  
It is particularly striking that, during all the period that preceded the vote of the ZEV 
Mandate, the whole range of potential providers of ZEV technologies, particularly the 
carmakers, were not systematically consulted. Despite the fact that California has “an open 
political system with high levels of technical expertise in which there is a continuing and 
sophisticated debate about air quality management” (Grant, 1995, quoted by Kemp, 2003, p. 
9), neither serious ZEV market studies nor ZEV technology reviews were implemented. 
According to Tom Cackette, the Chief Deputy Executive Officer of CARB at that time:  
“The 2% and 5% numbers we came up with were tied to fleet sales and the 
ability of fleets to use a significant number of the vehicles. The study we did 
addressed where these vehicles might be sold in the early years when their limits Lessons learned from the Californian ZEV Mandate 
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on range would be the greatest. It was not a marketing study. In fact, we 
predicted fleets constituted the greatest use and that’s how we sized the early 
mandate”
2. 
In fact, most of the public hearings that preceded the adoption of the ZEV Mandate 
were focused on the other three emission classifications included in the Low Emission 
Vehicle Program
3. Surprisingly, ZEVs, the fourth emission classification of the Program, 
raised little discussion. Both public debate and private efforts followed rather than preceded 
CARB’s announcement (Brown, 2001, p. 67). To understand this lack of consultation and 
investigation, it is important to recall the context in which the ZEV Mandate was proposed 
and passed:  
i) Although it is difficult to precisely appreciate the weight of political pressures on the 
vote of the mandate, it is worthwhile stressing that the ZEV Mandate was discussed and voted 
in the midst of a political campaign for the succession of the Governor of California. 
Originally adopted by the Governor George Deukmejian Administration in September 1990, 
it was kept and reinforced by its successor, Pete Wilson, formerly a US Senator. Given the 
very poor environmental concerns and the “anti-government” attitude of the conservative 
Republican George Deukmejian during its mandate, it is reasonable to assume that the 
election of Pete Wilson, also Republican, was not unrelated to the vote of the ZEV Mandate 
the very same year. As opposed to George Deukmejian, Pete Wilson “was elected on a 
genuinely strong environmental protection record in the U.S. Senate as well as a strong 
program of environmental promises”
4. ZEVs were associated with a positive “green” image, 
which was apparently highly valued by Californian middle-class electors.  
ii) By 1990, California was experiencing a severe recession, partly because of important 
cuts in the military defence spending that until then greatly contributed to the powerful 
“Californian economic engine”. New high-tech sectors to invest in had to be found, and the 
prospective ZEV industry seemed to perfectly fit the requirements for defence conversion 
(Morales, Scott, 1991).  
iii) The technological context seemed favourable. Recent progresses of advanced 
battery technologies for consumer electronics raised high expectations about their potential 
scale-up and use in automotive applications. Also, GM had, since the end of the 1980s, a plan 
for commercialising a very innovative electric vehicle, namely the Impact. The presentation 
of the Impact at the LA Auto Show in January 1990 had a great influence not only on the 
public but also on Californian policy makers that took this event as evidence that “it was 
actually possible” (Kemp, 2003; Shnayerson, 1996). Moreover, the Impact had been designed 
by Hughes Aircraft, a subsidiary of GM located in California. It was therefore also a sign that 
high-tech Californian non-automotive companies could bypass Detroit giants. Therefore, 
ironically, it is perhaps one of the strongest opponents of the ZEV Mandate, GM, which might 
have contributed to its final approval by Californian politicians and regulatory authorities.  
iv) Finally, in the context of a history of distrustful and adversarial relationships 
between the car industry and Californian regulators, CARB could hardly correctly appraise 
                                                 
2 Automotive Industries, April 1993, “What if electric vehicles don’t sell”. 
3  Transitional Low Emission Vehicle (TLEV), Low Emission Vehicle (LEV), Ultra Low Emission Vehicle 
(ULEV). These standards of alternative vehicles were defined according to their level of emission of non-
methane organic gases, NOx and Carbone Oxyde. 
4 Prop 65 News, 1990, “The top of the wave? Proposition 65 After the 1990 Election”, December, Vol 4, No. 12. Lessons learned from the Californian ZEV Mandate 
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the technical and commercial prospects for ZEVs (Wallace, 1995). Most of their source of 
information on this emerging technology were ex-engineers, most of the time retired from the 
auto or space industry, or scientists who may be too “technology-focused”. This 
misinformation of politicians and CARB staff may have led them to over-react to the general 
context of optimism regarding the future of electric vehicle technologies.  
The basics of the ZEV Mandate 
CARB adopted the “ZEV Mandate” in September 1990, as part of the Low Emissions 
Vehicles and Clean Fuels (LEV) regulations. This regulation was based on the statement that 
the air quality in South California, especially the Los Angeles area, was the worst of all the 
United-States and had a considerable cost in terms of citizens’ health. This was of course not 
the first time Californian public authorities tried to tackle this issue. Since the 1950s, when 
Cal Tech researchers proved that the LA smog was a result of the joint role of hydrocarbons 
(HC) and nitrogen oxides (NOx), a number of air quality regulations were adopted. Although 
these Californian regulations were more stringent than federal standards, and allowed the 
slight reduction of pollution levels
5, the ZEV mandate represents a step forward relative to 
past regulations. Indeed, never before had Californian authorities passed such a “radical 
regulation”. On the technology side, fully battery-powered electric vehicles were seen as the 
only means of complying with the regulation. Therefore, in the absence of any major change 
in the typical US driving patterns, this regulation undoubtedly called for a technological 
breakthrough in order to compete with conventional vehicles. Battery technologies, the true 
bottleneck and common-link of all electric vehicles technologies, were particularly in 
demand. On the market side, the percentage of total sales of their passenger vehicles and light 
trucks that had to be ZEVs really challenged the carmakers: 2% in 1998, 5% in 2001, up to 
10% in 2003. Carmakers that failed to meet the requirements would be exposed to a $5,000 
fine per vehicle that falls short of the requirement.  
ZEV requirements in 1998, 2001 and 2003 (as of 1994) 
  Cars sold in 1992 in 
California 
ZEV requirement in 
1998 
(2% of 1992) 
ZEV requirement in 
2001 
(5% of 1992) 
ZEV requirement in 
2003 
(10% of 1992) 
GM  330,000 6,600  16,500  33,000 
Ford  320,000 6,400  16,000  32,000 
Toyota  195,000 3,900 9,750  19,500 
Chrysler  135,000 2,700 6,750  13,500 
Honda  125,000 2,500 6,250  12,500 
Nissan  90,000 1,800 4,500 9,000 
Mazda  45,000 900  2,250  4,500 
Total  1,240,000 24,800 62,000  124,000 
Source: CARB 
The extent of the ZEV market to jumpstart was all the more impressive since twelve 
other states decided to adopt the stringent Californian regulation soon after it was passed. It is 
particularly the case of Massachusetts, New York and Vermont that automatically adopt 
California’s emission standards. With California, these four states represented 18% of the US 
auto market in 2000. 
                                                 
5 Average reductions of 80% for HC and carbon monoxides (CO); 50 to 70% for NOx compared to the levels 
measured in 1965. However, at the beginning of the 1990s, cars still accounted for over 60% of HC and NOx, 
and 90% of CO emissions (Hall, 1997). The resulting pollution is especially worrying in the Californian South 
Coast Air Basin: in the mid-1990s this region exceeded federal standards for ozone on more than 100 days out of 
every year (Ashuckian, 1997). Lessons learned from the Californian ZEV Mandate 
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Crazy environmentalists against polluting industries 
It is only after the regulation was passed that the true “debate” really started. Given the 
lack of consultation prior to the vote and the magnitude of the requirements that carmakers 
had to meet, in terms of both number and type of vehicles, it is not very surprising that the 
first phase of the regulation was characterized by very tough conflict. The debates opposed on 
one side carmakers and their allies, principally their traditional suppliers and oil companies, 
and on the other side CARB staff supported by diverse environmentally-concerned 
communities and organizations
6.  
The “cons”  
The companies threatened by regulation opposed the Mandate before Californian courts, 
spending millions of dollars in these trials
7. The numerous talented lawyers hired by the 
automobile industry tried to prove by any means that the ZEV Mandate was irrelevant, unfair 
and inefficient. Carmakers also provided public authorities and medias with their own state of 
the art of the technology.  
Their statement was clear: because ZEVs technologies could not be ready by 1998, the 
regulation was unrealistic. It was an historical -say political- accident that had to be rapidly 
corrected, so the area of alternative vehicles could return to its traditional path driven by 
technologies and consumers, not by policy makers. Their arguments clearly favoured a self-
regulation approach. Regulators should minimize as much as possible their intervention and 
“let the market do it”. As soon as companies had a better, less polluting, technology at an 
affordable price, competition would force them to commercialise it. 
According to them, any technology-forcing regulations that distorted the free market 
could only worsen the situation. They claimed for instance that alternative vehicles that were 
forced into the market would have greater production costs. Therefore, consumers would not 
buy them, preferring to keep their older, more polluting, vehicles for longer, which would 
further increase air pollution. The only solution would be to subsidize the price of ZEVs until 
it came down at least to an acceptable price for upper-class potential drivers. This subsidy, if 
not integrally covered by the government, would be carried forward on the price of 
conventional vehicles, which would affect principally people who cannot afford to buy a 
ZEV. It is also likely that the additional costs the ZEV Mandate impose on corporate 
companies will reduce their profits and, in turn, their R&D expenses. Hence, this will 
negatively affect innovation and the environmental problems the ZEV Mandate intend to 
solve. Furthermore, if alternative vehicles are forced into the market before they are 
completely ready, the bad reputation of these “half-baked” vehicles will “poison the market”. 
This negative effect may last and affect even later more satisfying generations of alternative 
vehicles. The social legitimition of new technologies is crucial and often significantly affects 
their fate on the basis of perceptions.  
                                                 
6 The following sections list the principal arguments of the pro-Mandate and anti-Mandate mainly based on an 
extensive survey of newspapers articles and on the transcripts of the CARB hearings during which all 
stakeholders were invited to comment on the ZEV Mandate. These transcripts are available on-line on CARB’s 
website (http://www.arb.ca.go). 
7 According to a report from the California Interest Public Research Group, oil companies and carmakers spent 
$24m to lobby California officials from 1990 to 1994 (San Francisco Chronicle, May 12, 1994, “Driving them 
crazy”). Lessons learned from the Californian ZEV Mandate 
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The “pros” 
On the “other side”, powerful environmental associations and lobbies such as the Sierra 
Club, the Calstart consortium and the Planning and Conservation League Foundation put a lot 
of pressure on Californian authorities in order to make sure that they would not step back. 
They often recalled the long history of carmakers’ resistance to socially desirable changes 
related to safety and environment, which indeed did not support the self-regulatory approach 
proposed by the automobile industry. 
Opposing the “free-market argument”, they claimed that at that stage of development of 
alternative vehicles there is no market, no competition nor price that might drive the 
innovation process. Moreover, air being a public good, advocates of stringent regulation 
claimed that even if there was a market “somewhere” supporting firms’ strategies in the area 
of non polluting cars, it would not effectively work and provide incentives for companies to 
develop these vehicles. In the absence of market and prices to drive carmakers, the only way 
through which potential consumers could express their preferences are social and political 
pressures that drive regulations. In turn, regulations lead company behaviours. Therefore, 
during these early stages of an innovation process, regulation is the closest institution from the 
market… Put in a less provocative way, regulations create a “virtual market”, i.e. they 
substitute for market demands that cannot be expressed in other than political ways (Braun, 
Wield, 1994). 
Moreover, regulations do not only compensate for the lack of a proper market, they 
assist the take-off of alternative vehicles markets. Within the mandated niches, ZEVs will 
benefit from both economies of scale and learning processes. In turn, the improved, less 
costly, technology will find broader public acceptance, allowing for the regulation 
requirements ramp-up. The ZEV Mandate can therefore trigger a virtuous circle between the 
market take-off and technology progress. Environmental benefits would in the end derive 
from this virtuous circle. 
However, beyond environmental benefits, the ZEV Mandate was not only about the air 
that California breathed but also about the economic development of California and, at an 
even larger scale, the future of the American industry as a whole. According to some “pro-
Mandates”, such as Calstart whose leitmotiv soon became “Why wait for Detroit?”, the only 
way to achieve the required technological breakthrough was to bypass the incumbents and bet 
on other less technologically conservative companies. Indeed, at first glance, the traditional 
industry seemed more inclined to spend money on justice courts than on research
8. This local 
development strategy could of course benefit the numerous Californian innovative companies 
that at that time suffered from the slump of military contracts due to the end of the cold war. 
Because ZEVs are a new paradigm, an IT company could more easily design the car of the 
future than the traditional carmakers. Clearly, “the time for incremental change was over” 
(Cronk, 1995, p. 34). Once the process got under way, some first movers would begin to 
cement their advantages and build these into durable market shares (Morales, Storper, 1991, 
p. 96) Pushing further the dream, what was soon known as the “Californian ZEV industry” 
could become a laboratory for a new type of industry that matched the leading industrial 
model of the beginning of the nineties, that of “lean production”: a considerable segment of 
the industry would consist of “small-scale niche market manufacturers linked into a dense 
                                                 
8  According to some the last major innovation pioneered by the American carmakers was the automatic 
transmission (Dertouzos et al., 1989, quoted by Morales, Storper, 1991, p. 96) Lessons learned from the Californian ZEV Mandate 
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network of upstream input suppliers, subcontractors and service providers, thus forming a 
specialized industrial district in Southern California” (Morales, Storper, 1991, p. 2). As a 
result, the days of the old mass production model that dominated the automobile industry, 
characterized by industrial concentration -not to say collusion- and slow technological 
progress with little care for the consumers, were counted. Incubated within the “Californian 
ZEV industry”, this industrial model would expand to other industrial sectors and countries.  
The ambiguous effects of the original ZEV Mandate 
The actual effects of the ZEV Mandate were of course not as good or bad as both 
opposing camps claimed it. After five years, many contradictory effects, both positive and 
negative, could be disentangled. 
Positive effects, the pro-mandates were right  
First of all, there is no doubt that the ZEV Mandate triggered an unprecedented level of 
research and demonstration activities in the domain of electric vehicle technologies. 
Carmakers, because they could not take for granted that the CARB would eventually “come 
back to earth”, implemented large cooperative research programs on alternative vehicles. The 
very first one, created in 1992, was the United States Advanced battery Consortium 
(USABC). It gathered the Big Three, the electric power companies and the federal 
Department of Energy. It was aimed at investigating a wide range of battery technologies that 
could match the energy needs of future ZEVs. Two years later, the Big Three and their 
suppliers joined by the federal administration, represented by seven of their agencies, created 
the PNGV (Partnership for a New Generation of Vehicles) whose very ambitious goal was to 
produce the “Supercar”, this is to say a car three times as efficient (80 miles per gallon) as the 
typical 1990 sedan. Many official documents from USABC and PNGV referred directly to the 
potential ZEV markets enforced by CARB’s regulation. For instance, the two sets of criteria 
issued by the USABC, the mid-term and long-term battery goal performance, were 
respectively aimed at the 1998/2001 and 2003 deadlines of the ZEV Mandate (Larrue, 2003). 
In California, new high tech firms aimed at ZEV markets emerged and rapidly grew. 
These companies developed a wide range of products from components to whole cars. 
Electrosource, for instance, developed advanced lead acid batteries for electric vehicles. US 
Electricar a company that produced electric vehicles grew to 300 employees in 1995. In the 
electronic and electrochemical area a certain number of these companies were spin-offs, such 
as Arias Research Associates, another advanced lead acid batteries supplier. It is worthwhile 
noticing that during this early period, before the first 1998 deadline actually initiated a ZEV 
market, these companies were also supported by public financing through various channels 
(demonstration programs of ZEV technologies, research grants etc.). 
Finally, although it is very pervasive and therefore hard to accurately account for, the 
most important effect of the Californian regulation was to bring the issue of mobile sources of 
pollution and alternative vehicles to the forefront of worldwide public debates. As it is 
claimed by Shnayerson, the writer of the book on the history of the GM Impact project:  
“It seems clear that the mandate, by forcing the world's largest carmakers to 
start the hard R&D march to electric vehicles at a time when none but GM 
wished to do so, has been a triumph of social policy as important to the 
betterment of this country in its day as the Clean Air Act was a generation ago. 
Quite literally, it has jumpstarted the future of automotive transportation, and in Lessons learned from the Californian ZEV Mandate 
  - 10 - 
doing so shown, in an age of political selfishness and cynicism, that government 
can, on occasion, offer enlightened leadership” (Shnayerson, 1996). 
As a symbolic event, it supported the legitimation of various projects in existing 
companies that were reluctant to invest heavily in alternative vehicle technologies. It is 
especially the case of advanced battery companies that were much more focused on the fast 
growing and lucrative consumer electronics markets. Therefore these companies had little 
incentives to invest in a market for which neither the market, nor the technology was ready, if 
ever. The ZEV mandate has greatly helped the supporters of the electric vehicle challenge 
inside these companies. It is almost impossible to find a publication about their activities 
regarding batteries for electric vehicles, either technical or commercial, from one of these 
companies that does not start by a reference to the ZEV Mandate. This was further confirmed 
during our interviews with managers of advanced battery R&D departments, who told us the 
importance of the ZEV Mandate to defend internally the projects they were working on. This 
legitimation effect was also of dramatic importance for public authorities in all industrialised 
countries. We already mentioned that in the US, a dozen states followed the Californian 
strategy by adopting the ZEV Mandate. But it also had a major influence in Europe and in 
Japan which always referred to the “Californian benchmark” to legitimate their intervention in 
the area of alternative vehicles. 
Negative effects, the carmakers were right  
However the Californian regulation also had several negative effects on the pace of 
innovation in the area of electric vehicle technologies. 
At the level of vehicles, the regulation put an end to the pre-existing electric vehicle 
project of GM. The “Impact” project was initiated before the vote of the ZEV Mandate and 
discontinued soon after, in 1992
9. This event, which was in fact more related to a GM 
stringent cost-cutting plan, was of course used as an additional weapon in the Californian 
clean air battle: “what if public policy makers had mandated the PC in the 1970s?” innocently 
asked B. Purcell, Impact project manager at GM
10. The official reason given was that the ZEV 
market was interesting for the company only if GM could act as a first mover and keep its 
monopoly position on that technology. Because the ZEV Mandate forced its six most serious 
competitors into the market, despite a certain leadership of GM due to its earlier investment in 
the area, it was not profitable anymore to commercialise an EV.  
At the level of batteries, the three US carmakers announced one after the other in 1994 
that their first generation of EV, aimed at the 1998 ZEV Mandate deadline, would have their 
energy stored and supplied by lead-acid batteries. It is all the more striking as, during the first 
years after the regulation was passed, the attention and all hopes were focused on new 
advanced batteries coming from the consumer electronic industries, especially nickel-metal 
hydride and lithium batteries. Unfortunately, at that time, these batteries had yet not been 
successfully scaled-up from small-size batteries for laptops to large capacity batteries for EVs. 
This conservative choice was seen by the supporters of the ZEV Mandate as the last strategy 
of carmakers in order to ruin the Californian regulation. On the opposite side, carmakers 
emphasized that they were obliged to choose the best available technology, i.e. the more than 
centenary lead-acid battery, because of the agenda of the regulation. They claimed during the 
                                                 
9 Automotive News, December 14, 1992, “GM backs off electric goal”. 
10 Automotive News, September 18, 1995, “Purcell: mandate has slowed EV”. Lessons learned from the Californian ZEV Mandate 
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1994 biennial review that the ZEV Mandate was compelling the industry to develop “sub-
standards vehicles” that, in the end, nobody would buy because of their poor performance
11. 
According to them, the first deadline of the regulation was too close for them to be able to 
integrate new technologies into their EVs.  
Especially in the case of purpose-built EVs, it is indeed impossible to simply integrate 
the best battery at the last moment into a vehicle with a drive train and a body that has been 
designed individually from the battery. Let us recall that, in ZEVs, the battery determine all 
the performances of the vehicle, from its cost to its speed, acceleration and, last but not least 
in vehicle design, its weight. A certain level of coordination is therefore needed in the co-
development of the battery and the vehicle. Moreover, before a battery can be integrated in a 
commercial vehicle it has to be extensively tested in real conditions in order to verify the on-
board durability of its performance. During our interviews, battery and ZEV experts often 
insisted upon the extent to which this electrochemical device was still some kind of “black 
box” whose performance could be measured but whose internal processes were hardly 
understood at a fundamental level. Despite recent progresses in simulation models, advances 
in battery R&D were therefore strongly based on trial and error processes, this is to say that 
any changes on battery active materials had to be followed by a long phase during which the 
new design had to be “cycled”, first in laboratories according to various standardized cycles 
representing different uses (urban, sub-urban etc.), then on-board, given that laboratory tests 
and on-road tests often provided different results.  
Therefore, the choice of the battery for the ZEV generation 1998 had to be done as soon 
as 1994, four years before the first regulation deadline. As a consequence, the ZEV 1998 
model-year was locked in the battery technology at 1994 levels. 
 
Phase II: Ceasefire And Peace Treaty…  
A compromise was eventually found and the situation unblocked in 1996. Contrary to the 
initial version that was intended to force its way to the commercialisation of ZEVs, the 
resulting amended mandate clearly favoured a more progressive and coordinated approach to 
the development of ZEV technologies and the market take-off. However, this was clearly seen 
by the regulation advocates as a step back from CARB. According J. Phillips, research 
Director at the Planning and Conservation League Foundation this plan proved “that the car 
company had managed to pull CARB into their campaign to suppress electric vehicle 
technology and cripple the small start-up companies”
12. 
From a “technology-forcing” to a “market-driven” regulation 
The first revision was preceded by a phase of evaluation of the progresses accomplished 
since the mandate was passed in 1990. On this basis, a “market-driven” approach, which took 
into account in a coordinated manner the market and the technology development, was 
implemented. 
                                                 
11 Automotive News, May 16, 1994, “Same old stalemate at Calif. Hearing”. 
12 Calstart News Press Release, August 2, 1996, “CARB Staff proposal repeals ZEV Mandate capitulates to oil 
and auto industry”. Lessons learned from the Californian ZEV Mandate 
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Evaluation of the state of art of battery technologies  
One of the most important evaluations of the expected performance and availability of 
batteries for ZEVs was carried-out in 1995 by a group of experts -the Battery Technical 
Advisory Panel- commissioned by the CARB. F.R. Kalhammer, a former research program 
manager at EPRI, the common research body of US electricy utility companies, headed this 
panel. In order to evaluate the readiness of battery technology for the 1998 implementation of 
the ZEV program, these experts visited almost all (about 20) current leading advanced battery 
producers in Europe, Japan and the US, scanning ten different battery technologies. They also 
visited major automobile manufacturers engaged in electric-vehicle R&D. 
The report supplied to the CARB concluded that only improved lead-acid and nickel-
cadmium batteries would be available in 1998, which validated the choice of lead-acid 
batteries that carmakers made in 1994
13. Indeed, based on the very similar views provided by 
battery producers regarding the steps and schedules required for successful development and 
commercialisation of advanced batteries, they confirmed the time-scale problem of the initial 
regulation which had been raised by carmakers. Indeed, according to these concordant 
elements of information, it was concluded that, after completion of cell-level R&D, at least 
eight years were needed to reach commercial operation. The Panel also emphasized that 
throughout this period, close collaboration between battery developers and vehicle 
manufacturers was essential to the successful integration of batteries into vehicles and the 
development of the specific performance for a commercial ZEV (Kalhammer, 1995). 
Although the Panel did not investigate the marketability of ZEVs with lead-acid batteries, 
they confirmed that most experts, especially in the automobile industry, believed that their 
limited range would restrict these vehicles to a market share less than the requirements of the 
1990 regulation. 
The confirmation of this apparent unresolved gap between the mandate ZEV requirements 
and the state of the art of ZEV technologies had a tremendous impact on the debate. It was a 
critical element of information that confirmed that carmakers could hardly fulfil the 1998 
deadline. Consequently, at its March 1996 hearing session, CARB announced that it had 
decided to modify the ZEV Mandate. As it was confirmed in a later report from the 
Californian institution, in making its decision CARB “relied significantly on the findings of 
the Battery Technical Advisory Panel report” (CARB, 1998, p.21), to the point that the report 
was said to be the “cornerstone for CARB’s decision to modify the original 1990 ZEV 
regulation” (p. 22)
14. 
However, the report was of course not the only element that triggered the CARB decision. 
During our interviews, a Ford battery program manager put the emphasis on the fact that a 
CARB representative was entitled to assist at technical meetings of the USABC, the formerly 
mentioned battery consortium. According to the manager, this direct channel of information 
to the “core” of US advanced battery R&D provided the CARB with up-to-date information 
that was different from those they used to collect through individual hearings of battery 
                                                 
13 Because of the toxicity of the materials, nickel-cadmium batteries were not seen as a desirable option in the 
US. 
14 Since this first Battery Panel Report, two other reports investigating the progresses of battery technologies 
have been releases, respectively in 2000 and 2002. The last one focused on batteries for hybrid vehicles, while 
the two first ones were exclusively concerned with batteries for pure” ZEVs. Lessons learned from the Californian ZEV Mandate 
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makers
15. Rumours and information regarding possible changes in the Mandate were 
becoming more and more precise since early 1995, before the release of the Panel report
16.  
Coordinating ZEV’s market and technology 
Based on these various expertise, CARB came to the conclusion that, although battery 
technologies had experienced progresses, an early introduction of ZEVs that could not 
perform to consumer expectation would have harmed the ZEV program as a whole. 
Consequently, the 1998 and 2001 deadlines were suppressed and replaced by a voluntary 
agreement between carmakers and the CARB. Contrary to the initial regulation, the 
Memorandum Of Agreement (MOA), which was the pillar of what CARB claimed to be a 
“market-based approach”, was aimed at encouraging the early years of ZEV introduction. 
According to the MOA, while maintaining the requirement for ZEVs in 2001 and 2003 and 
beyond, carmakers had to offset emission benefits lost due to the elimination of the ZEVs 
requirements in 1998 through 2002 by continuing investment in ZEV and battery R&D and 
placing specified numbers of advanced battery-powered ZEVs in marketplace demonstration 
programs. 
Carmakers MOA advanced battery demonstration requirements 
Number of vehicles 
Year  
Chrysler Ford  GM  Honda  Mazda*  Nissan  Toyota Total 
1998  51  181 182 101 28  70  135 748 
1999  103  363 365 202 55  141 271 1500 
2000  103  363 366 203 55  141 271 1502 
Total    3750 
Source : CARB, 1998, p. 4 
* Mazda, partly owned by Ford, decided not to develop its own ZEV model and buy ZEV credits from Ford to fulfill its 
requirements. 
As the comparison of tables 1 and 2 shows, the amount of vehicles that carmakers had to put 
on the road for experimentation before 2002 (3750) was far below the initial 1998 
requirements (which totalled 24800 ZEVs). However, the main important change had not so 
much to be found in the numbers but in the methodology of evaluation of ZEV credits. The 
agreement with carmakers now integrated a “technology development partnership” to further 
accelerate the commercialisation of advanced batteries
17. In order to provide incentives for 
R&D on new battery technologies, as opposed to the introduction of available lead-acid 
batteries, CARB differentiated batteries according to their respective performance. In the 
initial version of the Mandate, all ZEVs that had to be commercialised by carmakers had the 
same weight in the requirements set by the CARB, whatever technology they used. According 
to the revised mandate, a ZEV with superior performance could count three times more than 
other “traditional” ZEVs. Therefore, carmakers had the choice between either putting many 
                                                 
15 The importance of the CARB representative in USABC technical meetings is confirmed in CARB’s 1998 
biennial report (CARB, 1998). 
16 See for instance: Automotive News, « Calif. May bend ZEV rule », June 06, 1995.  
17 Calstart News Press Release, August 2, 1996, CARB announces proposed agreement with automakers for 
ZEVs”. Lessons learned from the Californian ZEV Mandate 
  - 14 - 
“traditional” ZEVs on the road or introducing a smaller number of “advanced-technology” 
ZEVs. The performance of each type of vehicle was evaluated either according to the specific 
energy of the battery it integrated or according to its autonomy (see tables 3 and 4). Adding to 
this progressive approach, the requirements for each number of ZEV credits increased with 
time, making it more and more profitable for carmakers to choose ambitious ZEV technology 
strategies. Multiple credits for advanced batteries reduced the total ZEV requirements to just 
over 1,800 electric vehicles. 
Number of ZEV credits awarded according to the battery specific energy 
Specific energy in Wh/kg  Number of ZEV credits by ZEV 
40 (as of 1998) 





Source : CARB, ZEV Mandate, Final Regulation Order, Section 1960.1, Title 13 
 
Number of ZEV credits awarded according to the vehicle autonomy 
Vehicle autonomy in miles 
(from 1996 through 1998) 
Vehicle autonomy in miles 
(from 1999 through 2000) 
Vehicle autonomy in miles 
(from 2001 through 2003) 
Number of ZEV credits by 
ZEV 
No minimum  >100  >140  2 
>70 >130  >175  3 
Source  : CARB, ZEV Mandate, Final Regulation Order, Section 1960.1, Title 13 
The most important innovation of the 1996 revised version of the ZEV Mandate was the 
link it created between the ZEV market take-off and the progress of ZEV technologies. The 
idea underlying the initial 1990 regulation was that if some courageous public authorities 
challenged carmakers by mandating a large market for ZEVs, the needed technologies to meet 
this market would automatically follow because of the R&D incentives it provided. Several 
years later, confronted by the slow pace of progress and the opposition of carmakers they had 
to admit that it was not possible to mandate a breakthrough. On the “other side”, carmakers 
understood that a strategy of pure opposition, trying to remove by any legal means the 
regulation as a whole, was costly financially as well as in term of public image. They decided 
to cooperate with the Californian authorities in order to influence the regulatory process. 
 
Phase III: The Trojan Horse strategy…  
This cooperative phase, based on a pragmatic “market based approach”, went throughout 
following years. While “in the game” the carmakers requested public authorities to add more 
flexibility to the Mandate, so they could choose the most suitable and effective way to reduce 
polluting emissions. Backed by the technology of batteries, which was still slowly 
progressing, and by potential buyers of electric vehicles, who were still claiming in stated 
preferences surveys that they would accept to pay a premium for ZEVs but who were in fact Lessons learned from the Californian ZEV Mandate 
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buying more and more SUVs, carmakers did obtain considerable amendments to the 
regulation. Soon after that, they began using this additional flexibility to unfold their real -and 
unchanged since 1990- strategy: the complete removal of the ZEV Mandate. As of now, 
although the story is not over, it seems that the ZEV Mandate -or what is left from it- may not 
survive this new phase of opposition.  
More flexibility to the ZEV Mandate 
Most of these changes were integrated during the 1998 and 2001 revisions. The remaining 
“2003 and beyond” deadline was considerably modified, both quantitatively and qualitatively. 
Quantitatively, a new decrease in the number of ZEVs to be put on the road was again 
implemented, down to only 8,137 vehicles according to the “2001 ZEV Amendments”. The 
requirements for 2008 and 2012 were doubled but, given the previous reductions, the ZEV 
requirements for carmakers did not pass the requirements of the initial Mandate until 2015
18. 
Qualitatively, the two main areas of change in the regulation negotiated by carmakers and 
their allies (the oil industry in the first place) for the year 2003 and beyond involved the 
definition of cars that could qualify for ZEV credits and the awarding of multiple credits for 
the early introduction of ZEVs
19. We discuss these two major changes in the following 
sections. 
More flexibility in the definition of cars qualified for ZEV credits 
Arguing that the introduction of ZEVs could only be a progressive process, carmakers made 
the case that the introduction of Hybrid Electric Vehicles (HEVs) and Neighbourhood Electric 
Vehicles (NEVs) could be an effective way to support the ZEV market take off. According to 
the “market-driven regulatory approach” started in 1996, which among other things stated that 
the regulation must provide carmakers the option to pursue their preferred path towards ZEV 
commercialization, CARB agreed to add these types of alternative vehicles to the regulation. 
As for the 1996 revision of the Mandate, CARB officials made clear that it was not a step 
back and that they remained “committed to achieving zero emissions performance wherever 
feasible in the vehicle fleet”, but that the challenge was still to “determine how to achieve 
sustainable success in the field” (CARB, 2000, p.i). 
Hybrid vehicles 
In 1998, “Partial ZEV credits” (accounting for less than one credit) were allocated to hybrid 
vehicles, which combine an electric engine with an internal combustion engine. It was 
claimed that these “non-pure ZEVs”, although they do emit pollutants, could be a step on the 
road towards pure-ZEVs. The technologies related to the electric part of the HEVs, especially 
the battery, could improve gradually and its cost could diminish while being used in these 
vehicles. Therefore, the hybridisation rate, that is to say the balance of the electric part and the 
internal combustion engine part, would increase and the polluting emissions of the vehicle 
would decrease. According to this scenario, hybrid vehicles would progressively get closer 
                                                 
18 Automotive News, January 22 2001, “ZEV rule goes under the knife” (Automotive News, January 29 2001, 
“California turns ZEV Mandate upside down”). 
19 We do not enter here into the details of the regulation, which became very complicated as it was modified. For 
instance, it differentiated between the seven initial large manufacturers (six since the merger of Daimler and 
Chrysler) and intermediate manufacturers (BMW, Hyundai, Isuzu, Jaguar, Kia, Mazda, Mitsubishi, Rover, 
Subaru, Volkswagen and Volvo), those that had to comply with the regulation only from the 2003 requirements. 
We focus here on the regulation affecting the seven initial large manufacturers. Lessons learned from the Californian ZEV Mandate 
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and closer to ZEVs, without having to rely on the advent of a breakthrough in battery 
technology or a complete change in potential driver preference. 
Although this change in the Mandate had been discussed between the carmakers and CARB 
for several years, the final ruling was only published in 1998 because of the complexity of the 
issue
20. In particular, carmakers fought hard during the negotiations in order to gain more 
flexibility in the methods of determination of the number of ZEV credits that should be 
awarded to these vehicles. Eventually, a compromise was found and two methods were 
accepted to qualify hybrid vehicles for Partial ZEV credits: the so-called “efficiency method” 
and the “carbon dioxide method”. The efficiency method allows carmakers to qualify for 
Partial ZEV credits by commercialising hybrid vehicles with a federal fuel economy rating at 
least 30% better than a standard level set by the Californian regulation. The carbon dioxide 
method allows carmakers to earn partial ZEV credits with hybrid vehicles according to the 
difference of the vehicle’s CO2 emission and that of comparable gasoline-powered vehicles.  
Neighbourhood Electric Vehicles 
In 2001, Partial ZEV credits were awarded to small electric vehicles with limited speed and 
range. CARB had to acknowledge that these vehicles, named Neighbourhood Electric 
Vehicles (NEVs) not to say golf-carts, had clear advantages: while having zero emission, their 
technology is ready and their cost not prohibitive, contrary to full-size ZEVs which are still 
lacking the perfect low-cost high performance batteries. According to carmakers, 
neighbourhood vehicles could provide them with insights and research on the technology and 
the real condition use patterns of all types of electric vehicles. 
Moreover, they had supporters among several environmentalists and alternative vehicles 
experts who claimed that the battery technology was a problem only if one considers that an 
electric vehicle had to replace, and therefore compete with, current internal combustion 
engines. According to them, NEVs could find a niche for short-range urban mobility, which 
accounts for a substantial part of air pollution. For instance Daniel Sperling, the very influent 
Director of the Institute of Transportation Studies at the University of California, Davis, who 
has testified many times as an independent experts before the CARB and the House of 
Representatives regarding alternative vehicles issues, has been a long-term supporter of NEVs 
(Daniel Sperling, 1995).  
In 2001, CARB agreed to qualify these vehicles for ZEV credits. Neighbourhood vehicles 
were now part of the category of vehicles that, although they did not comply with the 
definition of ZEVs as it was set in the initial regulation, were awarded credits or partial 
credits. However, on the 10% of vehicles each carmaker had put on the road in 2003 
throughout 2008 this category of vehicles (hybrid-vehicles, ultra low emission internal 
combustion engine vehicles, neighbourhood vehicles) that is left to the initiative of each 
carmaker could not account for more than 8%. Therefore, under the new rule, the remaining 
commitment of the six largest carmakers to “real” ZEVs was only 2%, instead of 10% as it 
was initially planned in 1990. 
                                                 
20 It is worthwhile noticing that CARB proposed to allow carmakers to partly meet their requirements with HEVs 
as soon as 1994. However at that time, carmakers seemed still more incline to try to suppress completely the 
ZEV Mandate, starting from the 1998 deadline, not to modify it.  
See: Automotive News, May 9, 1994, “CARB appears ready to allow some hybrids”; Automotive News, June 12, 
1995, “CARB leans toward new hybrids”; Automotive News, August 14, 1995, “Carmakers rip CARB hybrid 
straw man”. Lessons learned from the Californian ZEV Mandate 
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More flexibility in the schedule of introduction of ZEVs 
Although the 1998 and the 2001 deadlines, had been removed from the Mandate schedule, 
several carmakers claimed that they were ready and willing to introduce ZEVs in California 
before the remaining 2003 deadline. They argued that these vehicles should be accounted for 
within ZEV requirements. Moreover, since these vehicles could significantly contribute to a 
successful ZEV market launch, carmakers argued that these early vehicles should be awarded 
more than only one ZEV credit. Indeed, both technically and symbolically, these early ZEVs 
were believed to be of great importance for a successful ZEV market launch: technically, they 
could be used as real conditions laboratories, delivering valuable information to all 
stakeholders; symbolically, they testified to Californian people the carmakers’ true 
commitment to electric vehicles. CARB officials, incline to favour any voluntary initiative 
from carmakers that could ease the fatidic passage of the 2003 deadline, accepted that the 
vehicles commercialised before the deadline would qualify for “Multiple” ZEV credits. 
The final conflict? 
Soon after the 2001 Amendments were passed, carmakers started the implementation of a 
new phase in their strategy, which might greatly endanger the very existence of the regulation. 
This strategy is based on exploiting the pitfalls of the last Mandate Amendments they 
negotiated with CARB in 1998 and 2001. 
Free electric golf carts for California 
Following several worrying articles in newspapers, GM officials confirmed in 2002 that 
they had a plan to deliver a great number of NEVs in California. Given the advantages 
discussed above regarding an early introduction of these vehicles on Californian roads, this 
plan was a priori compatible with the regulation. But it became a problem when the details of 
the plan were considered: the NEVs would not be sold, but given away to non-profit 
organizations such as non-profits businesses, hospitals, schools
21 . Therefore private 
consumers, which were the target market of the ZEV Mandate, would not have access to these 
vehicles. Moreover, these vehicles would not operate outside of closed-campus environments. 
The argument claimed by carmakers when they were trying to convince CARB officials to 
award ZEV credits to these small electric vehicles, especially that they would allow them to 
“softly” test the market and the technology, was not valid anymore under these conditions. 
Although Daimler-Chrysler did not disclose a similar plan, the fact that it acquired in 2000 a 
golf-cart maker, Global Electric Motorcar, also raised some serious doubts about its strategy. 
As it was claimed by David Modisette, executive director of the California Electric 
Transportation Coalition, the concern, not just with GM but with all the automakers, is that 
“when you start giving [NEVs] away, then you are not trying to make a real business out of it 
but are using it purely as a way to satisfy regulatory issues. That's not really a good-faith 
effort to create a real market”
22.  
The only interest of this plan of massive early introduction is of course for carmakers: by 
giving away or renting NEVs before the 2003 deadline, they are able to benefit at a reduced 
cost, compared to the price of real full-size electric vehicles, from four ZEV credits per 
                                                 
21 Carmakers were able to give away their NEVs instead of selling them since the term used in the regulation is 
“placement of ZEVs”. 
22 Los Angeles Times, July 5, 2002, “GM Jolts Electric Vehicle Market”. Lessons learned from the Californian ZEV Mandate 
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vehicles. As a total, this “short-term dumping” of NEVs almost offset their entire ZEV 
requirements for the coming years
23. Combining the credits allocated to NEVs and multiple 
credits for early introduction of electric vehicles, GM was supposed to benefit from 20,000 
credits for the fleet of 5,000 NEVs given away. This opportunistic use of NEVs during the 
pre-2003 period was all the more worrying that these vehicles would be, after a year of 
operation by non-profits organizations, either bought by them or returned to GM. Not 
surprisingly, in addition to maintaining that these vehicles could still provide valuable insights 
regarding the use of electric vehicles, GM’s defence was also based on the “free market 
argument” and the advantages for consumers. Don Walker, a GM spokeman, declared “it's a 
free market, and if we believe it is in the best interest of GM, then we will go ahead and do 
that (…). Our competitors are free to lower their prices. It's no different than big incentives 
on sedans. Maybe this will help bring the cost to consumers down.”
 24.  
The White House enters the arena 
Subsequent to their contribution to the modifications regarding the methods of 
determination of ZEV credits for hybrid vehicles and fuel cell vehicles, GM and Daimler-
Chrysler decided to sue CARB, arguing that the new rule violates federal laws that prevent 
states from setting fuel-mileage standards. Only federal institutions are entrusted to do so. 
According to carmakers, because the “fuel efficiency method” allows carmarkers to earn ZEV 
credits by improving the fuel efficiency of the hybrid vehicles they place on the market, the 
ZEV Mandate goes against federal laws and should be cancelled.  
This lawsuit could be just one more in a long list of court actions against CARB filed by 
carmakers and their allies since the beginning of the nineties if the White House had not 
decided to join them in their lawsuit. In October 2002, the Department of Justice advocates 
declared that the ZEV Mandate was pre-empted by federal laws
25. This action must of course 
be replaced in its strategic and political context: on the political side, Georges Bush, who lost 
the important state of Michigan to Al Gore during the presidential election in 2000, has since 
then tried to get closer to the state’s important decision makers, such as the union autoworkers 
and other institutions related to a greater or lesser extent to the powerful Michigan automobile 
industry. In addition to the well-known close links between the Bush administration and the 
oil industry, it also must be noticed that Andrew Card, prior to his current position of White 
House Chief of Staff, was the chief lobbyist for General Motors and also headed an important 
auto industry trade association that was suing CARB’s ZEV rule in the nineties
26. On the 
strategic side, it may not be unrelated  that carmakers attacked the mode of determination of 
credits for hybrid vehicles: the Japanese carmakers are way ahead of US carmakers regarding 
the commercialisation of hybrid vehicles. The Toyota and Honda hybrid vehicles 
(respectively the Prius and the Insight), although they are not as successful in the US as they 
are on their domestic market, have already entered the CARB review process to be awarded 
Partial ZEV credits
27. Despite several hybrid vehicle commercialisation plans disclosed by US 
                                                 
23 Los Angeles Times, December 5, 2001, “Amendment would tighten ZEV Mandate”. 
24 Los Angeles Times, July 5, 2002, “GM Jolts Electric Vehicle Market”. 
25 More precisely it is pre-empted by the Energy Policy and Conservation Act of 1975. 
26 Energy Daily, October 11, 2002, “Administration Attack On California Electric Vehicle Mandate Tees Up 
Greenhouse Fight”. 
27  This configuration, according to which Japanese carmakers do better than US ones at responding to US 
regulatory challenges, already happened in the 1970s with the Muskie Bill. This leads a Japanese scholar to 
provocatively stress an “interesting international distribution of labour between US policy making and Japanese 
technical solutions”: US policy makers define the problem and Japanese carmakers solve it (Maruo, 1997). Lessons learned from the Californian ZEV Mandate 
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carmakers, it seems clear that they bet on fuel cell vehicles, which are still far from ready for 
commercial use. Once again, carmakers and their allies emphasized the ZEV Mandate impact 
on the “natural” timing of technical progress. They argue that the need to devote engineering 
staff and resources to mid-term batteries for electric or hybrid vehicles actually detract them 
from the pace of fuel cell commercialisation (CARB, 2003). 
The “Strawman Proposal” 
The result of the latest strategic assaults from carmakers against the ZEV Mandate have 
been so far very effective: since they were very cunning at exploiting early introduction 
multipliers for a wide range of ZEV technologies, they have today enough banked credits to 
basically meet their ZEV credit requirements without commercializing anymore ZEVs for the 
next 5 to 7 years
28. Moreover, major regulatory changes are expected again during the next 
2003 biennial review. This new phase of changes, the third in 7 years, are not independent 
from the recent pressure of the automobile industry and Bush Administration. Indeed, their 
recent lawsuit, which resulted in a court injunction in June 2002, has blocked the 
implementation of the 2003 deadline, pending on the final resolution of the case
29.  
The new changes proposed by CARB staff, which will be discussed later in 2003
30 are 
integrated in a package known as the “Strawman proposal”. According to this proposal 
(CARB, 2002): 
−  The start of the ZEV requirements is delayed until 2005. All carmakers banked credits 
are fully retained;  
−  The “pure-ZEV” requirements are reduced to 1% from 2005 to 2008, 1.25% from 
2009 to 2011, 3% from 2012 to 2014 and 4% for 2015 and beyond. As a total, this 
represents an 85% cut in the number of pure-ZEVs requirements from 2003 to 2011 
(Modisette, 2002); 
−  In order to cope with the federal preemption, the “fuel efficiency method” used for the 
calculation of Partial ZEV credits for hybrid vehicles is removed;  
−  In order to tackle the issue raised by carmakers that hybrid vehicles research and 
commercialization benefits from the timing of the Mandate to the detriment of fuel-
cell vehicles, greater amounts of credits are awarded for the demonstration of fuel-cell 
vehicles from 2003 to 2011;  
−  Also, efforts by carmakers to install hydrogen infrastructure for fuel-cell vehicles will 
be rewarded by ZEV credits. 
If these changes are voted in a likely “2003 ZEV amendments”, the ZEV Mandate will 
further lose its consistency and credibility to the point that its existence is greatly endangered. 
                                                 
28  This is true when total amounts of ZEV requirements and ZEV banked credits are considered for all 
automakers taken together. This may not be valid on an individual basis as some carmakers exceed the 
requirements and other fall short of it. However, total amounts calculations make sense since carmakers are 
allowed to trade their ZEV credits.  
29 Automotive News, December 9 2002, “More retooling for Calif.’s emission mandate”; Energy Conservation 
News, January 2003, “More delays for CA ZEV Program”. 
30 They were supposed to be discussed on the 27
th of February 2003, but the revision was delayed because no 
agreement could be found. The various expectations about fuel cells have led the situation to a deadlock. Lessons learned from the Californian ZEV Mandate 
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However, once again, the adversarial behavior from carmakers and, more recently, from the 
federal administration, is not the only factor in CARB’s step back: the technology still seems 
to be on the side of the regulation opponents: not only the “perfect battery” that could store 
great amount of energy at a competing cost is still lacking but also “projections regarding the 
pace of commercialization of fuel cells, which were projected to provide a second ZEV 
technology late in the current decade, have become less optimistic” (CARB, 2002). More 
precisely, CARB staff believes that a true commercial introduction will not occur before 2011 
(CARB, 2003).  
 
Conclusion 
We have argued in this article that the case of the ZEV Mandate can provide valuable 
insight to policy makers, especially in Europe. Because this regulation oscillated from one 
extreme to the other, evolving from a very stringent “technology-forcing” regulation to its 
current progressive “dilution”, it can help policy makers to map effective responses to the 
various trade-offs which have to be solved while designing an ambitious regulation that aim at 
supporting the emergence of a radical technology.  
i) Short-term versus long-term objectives. If the deadline of the regulation is too close 
relative to the state of the art of the technology at the moment the regulation is voted, it can 
“freeze” the technology by focusing research on short-term technological options. It was the 
case for the 1998 deadline of the ZEV Mandate which obliged industry to focus on the 
integration of lead-acid batteries to the detriment of research on advanced batteries. The 
problem, especially in the case of electric vehicles, is that as time goes by new marvelous 
technologies keep on emerging and raise high expectations. For instance, automakers have 
recently claimed that the next deadline deter research on the current long-term option, fuel 
cells, to the benefit of hybrid-vehicles. However, if the deadline is too far away, the regulation 
loses its strength and “dilutes” the technology. 
ii) Means versus objectives. Although US regulations are usually mostly definitive on 
targets and flexible on means (Ashford, 2003), it was often argued in the case of the ZEV 
Mandate that CARB had become more interested in electric vehicles than in the air quality. 
The question was very complex at the beginning since ZEVs were at the same time a 
technology (fully battery-powered vehicles) and an environmental norm (no emission). To 
counter this argument and show it did not lose sight of the final objective, CARB staff has 
qualified more and more categories of vehicles, given the idea that the same level of 
environmental benefits can be achieved with various means. However, carmakers have so 
well exploited their newly acquired flexibility in the means with NEVs or low pollution 
gasoline vehicles than the final environmental objective of the regulation is today unlikely to 
be met. 
iii) Rigidity versus flexibility. If the regulation does not leave a door open for 
negotiation and evolution, it cannot adapt to the new information supplied by the research and 
demonstration activities it triggers. Ambitious regulations with far reaching goals such as the 
ZEV Mandate rely on technology progresses that are uncertain by nature. However, if the 
regulation is too flexible, it loses its credibility and stimulates more lobbying efforts than 
innovative efforts, to the point that the content and agenda of the regulation is “captured” by 
powerful incumbents, as it seems to be now the case of the ZEV Mandate after the 1996 
Amendments. One lesson of the ZEV Mandate is that a serious consultation and negotiation Lessons learned from the Californian ZEV Mandate 
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process with all concerned stakeholders must be carried-out before the creation of the 
regulation in order to limit strong oppositions from the start. Although regulations always 
operate in a certain level of uncertainty that raises controversy, it is important to at least 
obtain a certain degree of consensus regarding the technological and market assumption, or 
“scenario”, that underlies the regulation. This was far from being the case in the original 
version of the ZEV Mandate. When no consensus can be achieved there is a need for further 
research and experimentation until the uncertainty regarding technological possibilities, 
economic costs and environmental gains decreases to a “bearable” level (Kemp, 2000). 
iv) Incremental versus breakthrough. If the ZEV Mandate may support the basic claim 
of carmakers, according to whom “it is impossible to mandate a technological breakthrough”, 
it has not invalidated ambitious regulatory approaches. However, these regulations that 
integrate in their assumption significant technological progress must set a path to their far-
reaching goals, for instance by implementing progressive “technological steps” into their 
agenda. The all-or-nothing attitude initially adopted by CARB, relying on a very unlikely 
advent of a new paradigm shift that would permit to bypass the automobile industry, did not 
integrate such a progressive approach and was therefore doomed to fail. On the other hand, 
the current approach that allows more and more polluting and conventional vehicle to qualify 
for ZEV credits to the detriment of innovative solutions does not provide powerful incentives 
to innovate. 
 
The ZEV Mandate does not only provide insights about the extreme solutions that 
circumscribe the principal regulation trade-offs, it also offers with its 1996 and 1998 
amendments an example of a relatively well-balanced regulation. The very first positive 
aspect was that it had been preceded by an almost exhaustive technology survey and 
numerous negotiations with industry representatives. Thanks to the relationship with USABC 
prior to the amendment and a disclosure agreement with carmakers in order to track their 
efforts, they were able to closely follow the progress they have accomplished. Through the 
system of increasing credits according to the performance of the ZEV and its battery, it 
allowed for flexibility of choice while setting clear directions and incentives for technical 
progress and market take-off. In a way, the regulation provided an incremental approach 
towards a disruptive innovation. The system of partial credits for hybrid vehicle also followed 
the same vein, although it should have integrated a clearer reference to the hybridization rate 
of these vehicles.  
Unfortunately, because the ZEV Mandate was amended in 1996 after six years of inflexible 
resistance, it seemed that CARB was giving in to regulation opponents. More than a change in 
the method, CARB’s new cooperative regulatory approach was therefore interpreted by the 
latter as a possible sign of weakness of Californian authorities. Subsequently, exercising 
constant pressures while “in the game”, carmakers managed to capture the regulation and 
begun clearing it out “from the inside”. This might be another lesson learned from this case: it 
is very hard to modify a regulation that experienced a “wrong start”. We hope the future of 
the regulation will prove the contrary and that it will provide more than a negative heuristic 
for other policy makers. Lessons learned from the Californian ZEV Mandate 
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Chronology of events related to the ZEV Mandate (1990-2003) 
YEAR EVENT 
1990 
•  September: the Low Emission Vehicle Program, including the ZEV Mandate, is voted. 
The 7 largest carmakers in California must “place” 2% of ZEVs in 1998, 5% in 2001 and 10% 
in 2003. At that time, only fully battery-powered electric vehicles are considered as ZEVs. 
•  Carmakers sue CARB for having implemented an irrelevant, unfair and inefficient 
“technology-forcing regulation”. They basically claim that it is impossible to mandate a 
technology breakthrough and that ZEVs without drivers will not improve the air quality. 
1992 
•  First biennial review of the ZEV Mandate: CARB makes no changes. The multiple 
lawsuits are maintained. 
•  The Department of Energy and the Big Three create the United States Advanced battery 
Consortium. The common research efforts, undertaken on a wide set of different advanced 
battery technologies, aim at pure electric vehicles. 
1994 
•  Second biennial review of the ZEV Mandate: CARB makes no changes. The multiple 
lawsuits are maintained. 
•  One after the other the US carmakers announce that their 1998 model year ZEVs will be 
powered by lead-acid batteries, not by advanced batteries (nickel-based, sodium-based or 
lithium-based batteries), which are still not ready. 
•  The Big Three and the federal administration create the Partnership for a New Generation of 
Vehicles (PNGV). This research consortium mainly focuses on hybrid and fuel-cell vehicles 
able to reach the ambitious 80-mpg objective. 
1995 
•  CARB orders an independent electric vehicle battery technology survey. The result of the 
survey is that only lead-acid batteries will be ready for commercialization at a reasonable cost 
for the 1998 model year ZEVs. 
•  CARB publicly asks carmakers to propose amendments to the ZEV Mandate. 
1996 
•  Third biennial review of the ZEV Mandate: CARB withdraws the 1998 and 2001 
deadlines. The ZEV requirements until 2003 are replaced by a Memorandum of Agreement 
with the carmakers. Based on a “market-driven regulatory” approach, this collaboration aims at 
supporting both a progressive ZEV market launch and incremental progresses in ZEV 
technologies, especially batteries. 
1998 
•  Fourth biennial review of the ZEV Mandate: The mandate is further amended to allow 
major manufacturers to satisfy up to six percent of their ZEV requirements with partial credits 
from extremely low-emission ZEV including compressed natural gas cars and Hybrid Vehicles 
(HEVs) 
2001 
•  Fifth biennial review of the ZEV Mandate: Partial ZEV credits are provided to 
Neighborhood Electric Vehicles (NEVs). Moreover, multiple credits are awarded to the 
carmakers that will voluntary place pure-ZEVs or HEVs or NEVs, before 2003. 
2002 
•  Taking the most from the “2001 ZEV amendments”, carmakers “bank” multiple credits by 
putting on the road limited number of NEVs and ZEVs before 2003. 
•  GM, Daimler-Chrysler and the Bush Administration jointly sue CARB for having used fuel-
economy standards, preempted by federal laws, in their methods of calculations of the number 
of ZEV credits awarded to HEVs. The implementation of the 2003 deadline is blocked. 
•  The USABC, created in 1992 for 10 years, is terminated. Despite progresses, no battery 
technology match the initial performance-goals of the consortium. 
•  The PNGV is replaced before its end by the Freedom Car Intitiative that focus on fuel cell 
vehicles only.  
2003 
•  Sixth biennial review of the ZEV Mandate: The “Strawman Proposal” is discussed. 
According to this proposal all ZEV requirements are delayed until 2005, “pure-ZEV” 
requirements are significantly reduced, greater amounts of credits are awarded to fuel-cell 
vehicles and efforts by carmakers to install hydrogen infrastructure for fuel-cell vehicles are 
rewarded by ZEV credits. 
•  CARB delayed rewriting the ZEV mandate. Deadlock over how to switch focus to fuel-cell 
vehicles. Carmakers propose to give up battery-powered ZEVs and dedicate more attention to 
long term technologies such as fuel cells.  
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